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A Comment on Regulation and Deregulation in a
Nation With Multiple Sovereigns
Thomas B. Leary*

I. INTRODUCTION

A keynote speaker presumably should introduce a theme that will
carry forward through most, if not all, the individual panels that follow.
That presents a considerable challenge in a program on a subject so
broad and so important as "Competition, Consumer Protection and
Energy Deregulation."
To prepare for this task, I reviewed a number of the scholarly papers
that were circulated in advance, as well as the Report on electricity
restructuring recently published by our staff experts at the Federal Trade
Commission.1 There is a wealth of learning in these materials, which
cannot possibly be summarized in a short speech. It is my personal
view, 2 however, that one fundamental issue pervades much of this
discussion. That issue is the appropriate allocation of responsibilities
between the federal government and the governments of the individual
states.
These opening remarks will therefore focus on the particular
challenges presented by multiple, overlapping, and sometimes
conflicting federal and state regulatory regimes. Issues of this
kind-sometimes referred to as issues of "federalism"-are also
significant in many other areas of our society, but are nowhere more
important than they are in the area of electricity regulation and
deregulation.

*

Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission.

1. FED. TRADE COMM'N, COMPETITION AND CONSUMER PERSPECTIVES ON ELECTRIC
POWER REGULATORY REFORM: FOCUS ON RETAIL COMPETITION ch. II, at 13-31 (Sept. 2001)
[hereinafter 2001 FTC STAFF REPORT], available at http://www.ftc.gov (last modified Feb. 5,
2002); see also FED. TRADE COMM'N, COMPETITION AND CONSUMER PERSPECTIVES ON
ELECTRIC POWER REGULATORY REFORM: FOCUS ON RETAIL COMPETITION (2000).
2. Everything said here represents my personal views, which are not necessarily shared by any
other Commissioners. I acknowledge the valuable assistance of Thomas J. Klotz and Michael S.
Wroblewski in the preparation of this paper.
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II. A CAPSULE POLITICAL HISTORY OF FEDERALISM

The allocation of power between the federal government and the
states has, of course, been the subject of controversy since the
constitutional convention of 1787. Three quarters of a century later, the
controversy erupted in the Civil War and, even today, it still can arouse
passionate feelings.
Sensitivity to issues of "federalism" 3 or "states' rights" is often
associated with a "conservative" political philosophy but, in reality, it
cuts across the political spectrum. An appeal to states' rights was an
important element in the conservative critique of expanded federal
regulation under President Franklin Roosevelt. A half century later, the
avowedly conservative President Ronald Reagan stressed the
importance of state sovereignty. On the other hand, liberals supported
state regulation of business over a century ago by citing the virtues of
varied "laboratories of democracy." Most recently, liberals used a
states' rights argument to help defeat federal tort reform. There are
many other examples on both sides of the liberal/conservative divide.
My personal view is purely pragmatic, depending on the particular
issue, with no ideological preference for either state or federal
involvement. The states and the federal government will each have
continuing roles in the electricity field. I believe, however, that we need
to pay more attention to the potential for conflicts as we go forward.
III. FEDERALISM IN THE CONTEXT OF ELECTRICITY DEREGULATION
The Commission staff released its most recent report on restructuring
after receiving a substantial number of public comments. One comment
was notable for the vivid way that it described the problems created by
the evolution of the electric power industry away from what was once
considered primarily a local enterprise.
[W]hile the electric utility industry was constructed over many
decades as an archipelago of electrical islands, it is rapidly evolving
into a network of interstate transmission paths, increasingly analogous
to the natural gas pipeline grid.4
The originally fragmented structure of the industry, however, still
affects the way people think about it.
3. It is odd that people who describe themselves as "federalists" today tend to be concerned
about states' rights, but 200 years ago the Federalists tended to support a strong federal
government.
4. Center for the Advancement of Energy Markets, Comments Regarding Retail Elec.
Competition submitted to Federal Trade Comm'n 6 (Apr. 4, 2001).
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[T]he electric power industry has been balkanized by law for so many
decades that it seems perfectly normal to market participants to treat
each state as a sovereign nation with conflicting rules 5and tariffs for
"importing" and "exporting" power to fellow Americans.

This point of view would seem simply bizarre in the context of any
other industry. It can cause serious practical difficulties in a period of
electricity deregulation.
There is a trend toward deregulation at the federal level. At that
level, we have seen deregulation of the airline and trucking industries in
the 1970s, natural gas in the 1980s and more recently,
telecommunication. 6 In electricity, federal restructuring began with the
passage of the Energy Policy Act of 1992, 7 which initiated the process
of opening access to the transmission grid and encouraging independent
operation of the transmission grid to increase competition at the
wholesale level. Subsequent actions by FERC have continued to
8
increase reliance on competition in wholesale electricity markets.
On the other hand, some state regulators-particularly in light of the
recent power crisis in California-overtly favor traditional cost-based
electricity regulation. It is their view that traditional regulation is the
best way to avert an unforeseen disaster like that experienced in
California.9 They see reliability and foreseeability as paramount
objectives, even if a deregulated industry may be more efficient in most
scenarios.

5. Id. at 16.
6. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. 1057 (D. D.C. 1983), aff'd sub nora.
California v. United States, 464 U.S. 1013 (1983) (telecommunications); Telecommunications
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 56; Motor Carrier Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-296, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N (94 Stat.) 793 (trucking); Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-621, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N (92 Stat.) 3350 (natural gas); Airline Deregulation Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N (92 Stat.) 1705 (airlines); Pipeline Service
Obligations and Revisions to Regulations Governing Self-Implementing Transportation Under
Part 284 of the Commission's Regulations; Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial
Wellhead Decontrol, Order No. 636, F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. (CCH) T 30,939 (1992).
7. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
8. See, e.g., Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities, Order No. 888, F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. (CCH)
31,036 (1996).
9. See, e.g., Electricity, Markets: Lessons Learned from California Before Subcomm. on
Energy and Air Quality of House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. (2001)
(statement of Carl Wood, California Public Utilities Comm'n), available at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/l07/hearings/02152001 Hearing40/Wood36print.htm; Retail
Electricity Competition Before Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources. 106th Cong.
(1999) (statement of Marsha Smith, National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners),
available at http://www.naruc.org/Congressional/ 1999/marsha smith.html.
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Even though I might disagree, I cannot claim that this is an irrational
position. A familiar and stable regulatory regime may be likened to an
insurance policy, and insurance always costs something. Essentially,
we are talking about societal judgments based, in part, on different risk
tolerances, and it might seem appropriate for different state
governments to reflect these different judgments. This is supposed to
be a significant benefit of federalism. But, unfortunately, it is hard to
see how a traditional regulatory philosophy can comfortably co-exist
with deregulation either at the federal level or in neighboring states with
different preferences.
IV.

SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF CONFLICTS

Consider three examples of situations where there can be serious
tensions between deregulation at the interstate wholesale level and state
autonomy with continued regulation at the retail level.
The first is the recent situation in California, where there were
extraordinary wholesale price elevations, brownouts and bankruptcies.
Knowledgeable people there simply did not foresee the extraordinary
combination of factors that contributed to the emergency. In retrospect,
it is clear that deregulation of wholesale prices, coupled with state price
caps for customers not choosing a new supplier and state restrictions on
long-term contracts, was a recipe for a disaster, which will burden
taxpayers and ratepayers in California for a long time to come. The
lesson is that price caps at one level of distribution and market prices at
another level often do not mix comfortably in this industry.
The second is another, more general, example of inefficiencies
associated with different federal and state regimes. There is general
agreement that successful wholesale competition depends on efficient
operation of the interstate transmission grid, because transmission can
substitute for new generation services. An efficient interstate grid
obviously requires regional cooperation in the siting of new or upgraded
transmission facilities. Beyond that, efficient operation also depends on
independent and nondiscriminatory open access to transmission
facilities and efficient pricing of services. You cannot allow the states
to erect tollgates.
But what happens if you have an overlay of state regulation that
establishes pricing differentials for transmission services, depending on
whether the customers are "wholesale" buyers of transmission services
alone or "retail" buyers of bundled services? 10 The disparate price
10. See 2001 FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 20-21.
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signals for use of the transmission grid will lead to inefficient utilization
of facilities. And, as is true with all distortions produced by regulation,
the inefficiencies tend to create incentives for further inefficiencies. (It
might, for example, inhibit construction of more efficient local
generating facilities or other cascading external effects.)
The third example involves efforts directed at the demand side. A lot
of people believe that substantial savings are possible if the peaks and
valleys of electricity demand are smoothed out by charging variable
rates to retail consumers depending on the hour of the day. Such
variable pricing is described in the recent Commission Staff Report.
Nearly every retail electricity market is missing one of the important
components of effective market operation: variable pricing and rate
information that allow customers to adjust the quantities they consume
in response to rapid and substantial changes in wholesale prices of
obtaining electricity ....It is insufficient to provide accurate price
signals only to wholesale buyers (i.e.,
retail suppliers), and not retail
customers, because a wholesale buyer's demand at any point in time is
directly derived from retail demand of its customers. 1
As customers react in a reasonable way, real-time pricing could reduce
the need for investment in additional capacity to handle peak loads. It is
obvious that the effectiveness of this strategy will be curtailed if some
states in a linked region decline to impose real-time pricing, perhaps out
of concern for consumers who are uninformed or perceived to be
relatively inflexible.
V. TENSION BETWEEN DEREGULATION AND
"NON-ECONOMIC" REGULATION

The potential for conflict is not diminished just because a particular
state regulation seeks to foster what are thought of as "non-economic"
goals. People often draw a distinction between so-called "economic"
regulation of business, which addresses matters like price and entry, and
"non-economic" regulation that addresses matters like health, safety or
the environment. The difficulty is that even overtly non-economic
regulation can have serious economic consequences.
One obvious example, cited in the FTC Staff Report, concerns the
standards for authorizing the construction of generating plants.12 The
Report recommends specifically that states should not require a
demonstration that the facility is required to meet a "local" need for
power. Obviously, the most efficient configuration of generators in an
11.
12.

Id. at 33.
Id. at 26.
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interstate electricity grid is dependant on a number of factors above and
beyond local demand-including, for example, the feasibility and cost
of meeting local demand from distant sources or the relative costs of
supplying fuel to the generating plants.
States may be reluctant to authorize installation of capacity beyond
that necessary for local needs, even if it is efficient from a regional
point of view for a number of reasons-including environmental
considerations, a "non-economic" goal. The 2001 FTC Staff Report
expressly declines to address environmental issues, 13 presumably to
avoid the impression that the agency is intruding into sensitive matters
beyond its regulatory authority and expertise. But, even as we in the
Commission acknowledge that other government bodies have the
responsibility for dealing with environmental or other "non-economic"
concerns, we should not forget that we have a particular responsibility
to be advocates for competition and for efficiency across the board. If
other government bodies choose to adopt policies that are not
economically optimal, that is their privilege-but at least we can
contribute to the debate by helping people understand what the stakes
are.
Another example of potential conflicts among state regulations arises
in the area of consumer protection, that is, state standards for assuring
that consumers obtain accurate and non-deceptive information about
sources and prices of power. This is particularly important in a
restructured environment where consumers are called upon to make
choices they have never made before. Consumer protection is, of
course, also an area where the Commission has its own authority and
expertise, but a proliferation of potentially inconsistent requirements
can create burdens for interstate enterprises.
Again, local authorities traditionally have had considerable autonomy
in these matters. 15 The conflicting considerations were summarized in
the FTC Staff Report, as follows:
Alternative retail suppliers and others widely viewed a lack of state

13. Id. at 27 n.83.
14. The Federal Trade Commission was originally created to serve as a non-partisan body of
experts on the competitive process. The Commission's exercise of this role led Congress to enact
the Public Utility Holding Company Act in 1935. See FED. TRADE COMM'N REP. TO THE
SENATE, UTIL. CORPS., S. Doc. No. 92, at 24 (1935).
15. There is currently no federal regulation that would pre-empt regulatory action by state
authorities. See Electricity Supply and Transmission Act of 2001: Hearings on H.R. 3406 Before
the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 106th Cong. (2001) (statement of Sandra L.
Hochstetter, National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners), available at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/107/hearings/12132001Hearing449/Hochstetter762.htm.
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uniformity in regulatory practices, including supplier licensing and
customer switching rules, as sources of substantial costs that
unnecessarily reduce headroom and entry incentives. At the same
time, many states believe that certain policies are necessary to serve
important consumer protection16and other public policy objectives such
as increased system reliability.
I do not suggest that pre-emptive federal standards are necessarily the
solution. I do suggest that issues of federalism, involved in both
"economic" and "non-economic" regulation, need to be openly
acknowledged and addressed. We in the Commission are continuing to
look at these problems, and we welcome your thoughts.
VI. CONCLUSION
These brief introductory remarks are intended to highlight a
potentially difficult issue that lies beneath a number of the specific
problems in energy regulation that will be considered by other speakers.
Federalism is a particularly delicate issue because it has ideological and
emotional connotations that cut across many other areas of political
debate.
Federalism is also a difficult issue in the context of electricity
restructuring because of the long tradition of treating retail electrical
service as primarily a local enterprise. It is not local any longer but, up
to now, "reform of retail [electricity] markets has been a hodgepodge of
highly disparate efforts." 17
We need to consider whether there are better ways of addressing
these issues. Solutions are not easy. A conference like this one, which
brings together a broad spectrum of views, will make a valuable
contribution to the effort.

16.
17.

2001 FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 64 (footnotes omitted).
Center for the Advancement of Energy Markets, supra note 4, at 6.

